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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MARK C. DOYLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

FACILITIES, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.
12912

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This appeal is from a summary judgment granted
on the 6th day of April, 1972, by the Honorable Ernest
F. Baldwin, one of the judges of the District Court of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, wherein the plaintiffappellant's complaint was dismissed with prejudice. (R.
85) Appellant brought an action against the respondent
claiming that damages he suffered while engaged in

1

laying roof sheeting on the Hooper Elementary Scli00,
in Hooper, Utah, were a direct and proximate resulto:
the negligence of the respondent.

1

DISPOSITION OF THE LO,VER COURT
Respondent moved the lower court for a summan
judgment dismissing the appellant's complaint ani
amended complaint. Respondent's motion was granteo

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks review and reversal of the Trial
Court's Order Granting Defendant-Respondent's
tion for Summary Judgment (R. 89) and Judgmentof
Dismissal With Prejudice (R. 87) further requesting
that the case be remanded to the Lower Court for a trial
on the merits.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts herein are simple and relatively uncon·
tested.
The appellant herein, Mark C. Doyle, was in tn<
fall of 1969, employed by Steel Components Inc.
Reid L. Oyler, contractor, obtained the contract for
the construction of the Hooper Elementary School m
. tricl
Hooper, Utah, from the Weber County School DJS ·
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(Exhibit D-3) Mr. Oyler subcontracted with Tech
Steel, Inc. for the roofing on the school, including steel
joists, structural steel, steel roof decking and the installation of the same. (Exhibits D-1 and D-2) Although
the contract is not a part of the record, Tech Steel entered into a subcontract with the respondent under the
terms of which respondent was to install the steel superstructure for the roof. The respondent further subcontracted with Steel Components, Inc. for the installation
of the steel roof decking.
On the 20th day of October, 1969, while engaged in
the installation of the steel roof decking the appellant
stepped upon a steel joist that had been negligently
placed by the employees of the respondent. The joist
rotated and fell causing the appellant to fall some 12-14
feet to the cement floor below. The accident necessitated
immediate and prolonged hospitalization of the appellan
and from which appellant has suffered permanent, irrepairable injury to his hearing, shoulder and back.
Observation and analyzation of the steel joist from
which the appellant fell evidence extreme negligence by
the respondent's employees in the manner of erection
and placement of the joist.

ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT - RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THERE
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EXISTING AT THAT TIME SUFFICIENT
QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW UPox
WHICH REASON ABLE MINDS COULD DIF.
FER AND UPON WHICH THE FINDER OF
FACT COULD REASONABLY GRANT JUDG.
MENT IN PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT'S FA.
VOR.
The defendant relies exclusively upon two recent
decisions handed down by the Utah Supreme Court. In
the first case of Smith vs. Alfred Brown Company, . . .
Utah, ______ 493 P.2d 994 (Feb. 1972), involved an em·
ployee of a subcontractor who sued the general con·
tractor for alleged negligence that resulted in damage1
to the employee. The Supreme Court in construing Sec·
tions 35-1-62, Vt ah Code Annotated, 1953, and Secti-0n
35-1-42, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, felt that a signin·
cant factor in determining whether or not an injureo
employee was in the same employment as the defendant
or whether the defendant was a bona fide third person
was the degree of control exercised by the third person
over the injured plaintiff. In the Smith vs. Brown case
the defendant, Brown, had a subcontract with the plain·
tiff's employer, Ashton Construction Company, whicn
provided that the general contractor would retain some
degree of control over the subcontractor whereas in
present case the subcontract agreement between Facili·
ties and Steel Components makes no reference whatso·
· dbr·
ever to any degree of control that would be exercise
Facilities over Steel Components or its employees. Tnr
facts are and as testified to by Mr. Reid Oyler, the gen·
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eral contractor on the Hooper Elementary School job,
are to the effect that .Mr. Oyler was not aware of who in
fact was engaging in the steel erection and decking until
he received notice of the pending action. It is also a fact
that Facilities did not in fact exercise any control or
supervision over the work described in the subcontract
given by it to Steel Components.

It must be remembered that in the Smith vs. Brown
case we are dealing with an employee of a first tier subcontractor who is suing the general contractor. The court
in finding that the "defendant general contractor,
Brown" had sufficient control over the subcontractors
under him, held that the employee should be deemed an
employee of the general contractor and thus precluded
from maintaining the suit. Whereas, in the present case
we have an employee of a fourth tier subcontractor who
is suing not the general contractor but his employer's immediate contractor or a third tier subcontractor. There
are at present only disputed facts that would give rise to
an indication of any degree of control or supervision exercised by Oyler Construction Company over the employees of Facilities and Steel Components. To hold
that the plaintiff herein and the employees of Facilities
Inc. were fellow servants and controlled and supervised
under direct authority of the general contractor would
he extending the rational of the Smith case a good· deal
further than the Supreme Court has set forth.
In the case of Peterson vs. Fowler, ______ Utah ______ ,
P.2d 997 (Feb. 1972) the court discussed at some

length the definition and terminology denominated ai
"same employment." The court stated that:
"In determining what constituted fellow
the courts were in practical uniformity (referrini
to common law hist?ry) in holding that unles1
they were. engaged m the same employment at
the same time they were not fellow servants soa1
to prevent an action against their common em·
ployer. If they were employed in separate depart.
ments of the same enterprise, they were not con·
sidered fellow servants unless their work was io
related that they were likely to be in such proxim.
ity to one another that some special risk could Of
anticipated towards one of the other were negJ1.
gent."
We would contend that in the present case the defeno·
ant, Facilities Inc., and Steel Components, the employer
of the plaintiff, were engaged in separate and distincl
operations. Facilities was to erect the structural iron·
work and Steel Components was engagedin laying the
decking on the roof. It is difficult to rationalize the facl
that Mr. Doyle was engaged in the same employmentai
Facilities when all the facts herein indicate that the
eration of erecting the structural steel and of layingilie
steel decking were two separate and different operations
The testimony of Mr. Doyle also indicates t!JBI
there would be no presumption that the employees ofilie
defendant would come in contact with Mr. Doyle iwi·
much as the steel erection was to take place prior to ilie
decking being laid and therefore the employees of ilit
defendant and the employees of Steel Componentswaulc

6

rn>t come into contact with one another so as to create a
special risk that could be anticipated by those employees.

CONCLUSION
There is no argument that all persons engaged in
the erection of a structure such as the Hooper Elementary School are engaged in the same general purpose. That being the erection of the building. The Smith
and Peterson cases, however, deal with only employees
in direct contact with the general contractor to hold that
all persons engaged at any time and in any capacity in
the construction of a building are all engaged in the
"same employment" is extending the rational of the
aboYe cases much further than the Supreme Court indicates therein.
The plaintiff herein, .Mark Doyle, was an employee
of a fourth tier subcontractor who had no relationship
with the general contractor, Reid Oyler, was not controlled or supervised in any manner whatsoever by .Mr.
Oyler and who were at the time of the construction of
the building unknown by the general contractor, Reid
Oyler. Again to extend the rational of the two recent
cases to the degree and extent that the defendant contends herein would be to in fact prohibit any action
whatsoever by an injured employee where such injury
results from the negligence of any one working for the
common cause of erecting a building or a similar superstructure. This in fact would amount to a judicial repeal
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of Section 35-1-62, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which
we would contend the court was not prepared to do in
the Smith and Peterson cases.
Respectfully submitted,
THOMAS A. DUFFIN
510 Ten Broadway Building

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Appellant
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